Critical Discourse Analysis: History, ideology, methodology

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Mark the musical confusion
Of hounds and echo in conjunction.
The skies, the fountains, every region near
Seem all one mutual cry.
— Midsummer Night's Dream

The diversity of the field of critical discourse analysis is a sign of vigorous interest and growth, but also challenge to any such report as mine. As I write this, lively international discussions, from Loughborough to Queensland to Sharjah, are under way in the site ‘Language in the New Capitalism’ (LNC) on such fundamental topics as ‘What is the point of critical discourse analysis [hereafter CDA]?’; ‘CDA & Academia’, ‘Accessibility and Democratisation in CDA’, and so on. Evidently, a need is widely felt for some renewed comprehension and consolidation, or some review and preview, of our enterprise. These very issues are central to own my latest book, where I have sought to situate the field within a comprehensive framework of the 'study of text and discourse', supported upon 2,382 data samples (Beaugrande 2004, posted on website). What follows is necessarily offered as a personal perspective, focused on the three aspects named in my subtitle.

A. History

Among the most imposing developments on the academic scene in the latter decades of the 20th century have been the emergence and accreditation of fields that were interdisciplinary from their very inception: systems theory, cognitive science, discourse processing, artificial intelligence, artificial life... A refreshing contrast to the self-isolation of disciplines, such as psychology and sociology each pretending the other didn't merit attention (cf. Beaugrande 1996), but also to the ambitions of ‘unified science’ to force everything into the framework of physics and formal logic — an arcane conflation of basic reality with hypothetical ‘worlds’ (Beaugrande 2004).
Meanwhile, ‘mainstream linguistics’ seems to me curiously retrograde in guarding its borders by steadily narrowing its quest from ‘language studied in and for itself’, ‘standing apart from everything else’ (Saussure 1966 [1916]: 13, 232) down to the ‘competence’ of ‘ideal speaker-hearer in a completely homogeneous speech-community’ (Chomsky 1965:3), logically terminating in ‘minimalism’ (see now Seuren 2004), whose very title defiantly announces its intention to address and explain as little as possible.

This line of reasoning implicitly promoted a bizarre disequilibrium in the role of the ‘theoretical linguists’ themselves. Since ‘language’ is never encountered ‘in and for itself’, the only way to address it was for the linguist to take on the fictional role of the ‘ideal speaker-hearer’ and to proceed via ‘intuition’ and ‘introspection’, as if in a two-lane royal road to language. Yet that same linguistics doubted whether speakers may be ‘aware of the rules’, or even able to ‘become aware’; and whether their ‘statements about their intuitive knowledge’ are ‘necessarily accurate’ (Chomsky 1965: 8). So linguists must be ‘super-speakers’ (Übersprecher) to whom is revealed what is hidden to ordinary speakers. Besides, they were confined to the investigation of languages in which they themselves were already fluent, which encouraged a ‘Eurocentric’ favouritism for familiar and historically related languages like English, French, and German.

Meanwhile, the study of discourse languished in the guise of ‘speech facts’ constituting a ‘heterogeneous mass’ that ‘we cannot put ‘in any category of human facts, for we cannot discover its unity’ (Saussure 1966 [1916]: 13), Half a century later, the received wisdom ordained that the ‘observed use of language’ ‘surely cannot constitute the subject-matter of linguistics, if this is to be a serious discipline’; ‘much of the actual speech observed consists of fragments and deviant expressions of a variety of sorts’ (Chomsky 1965: 3f, 201).

A quite different turn emerged in pragmalinguistics, a field whose name signalled a programmatic recentring of ‘linguistics’ on ‘pragmatics’ (Mey [ed.] 1979). Its capital programme was to ‘consciously and explicitly reflect on (1) the role of the linguist as producer and consumer of linguistics, as such delimiting (and limiting ) himself as well as his object; (2) the role of the interactants in a linguistic situation’, who ‘create the true “meaning” of that situation and its concomitant utterance(s) through the interplay with its (their) context and co-text(s)’; moreover, ‘contexts are dynamic not, static’, and ‘creative, not passive’ (Mey 1979a: 12f). ‘We should be prepared to ask’ ‘how can a particular linguistic theory be produced how can it be consumed?’ (Mey 1979a: 14; cf. Beaugrande 1991). ‘Whose ends are served’, and ‘how can it be applied to practical conditions?’ Here, ‘production’ and ‘consumption’ are being framed within the Marxist account of capitalism, which is to assist in
getting at implications below ‘the surface’ of ‘ordinary talk’, such as the ‘current service ideals of society’ as applied, say, to scientists’ as they navigate ‘behind the looking-glass of science’ (1979a: 16).

This inquiry is pursued in the same volume by a paper written in German in 1974 (all quotes here are in my translation), though its publication was delayed by domino collapses of publishing houses until 1979, when ‘critical linguistics’, the direct parent of critical discourse analysis, had emerged without realising it had been anticipated (Fowler et al., 1979). The bibliography includes almost no linguists (beside Chomsky, who had fixed the game so you had to cite him, whether for agreement or dissension). Instead, Marx and Engels appear alongside Bernstein, Freire, Goffman, Horkheimer, and Adorno.

With this broad base, a parallel is drawn between ‘language activity’ (‘sprachliches Handeln’, where the latter term carries the further connotation of ‘negotiation’) and ‘other areas of human activities’ (Mey 1979b: 411). ‘Language technique’ can then be defined by two aspects’, ‘controlling’ (‘technical production’) and ‘being controlled’ (‘psychic reaction’) (whereby German ‘kontrollieren’ carries the further connotation of ‘monitoring’). ‘Language’ as an ‘organ of control’ is most clearly at work in language education, with its kaleidoscope of trivial or arcane impulses toward ‘successful, “good” language activity’. ‘Especially in the school, the activity of the teacher is consciously directed at suppressing certain language activities in favour of others’ (1979b: 414).

Many researchers in CDA today will easily recognise the basic formulation of social consequences:

If control is to be effective, it should not be recognised as such. Indeed, impenetrable control in principle rules out conscious awareness. [...] Language as defence against manipulation can only be achieved insofar and the human being is conscious of the totality of its conditions of production. Manipulated language is always the consequence of an inadequate analysis of productive relations, [whereas] a successful analysis is, potentially or actually, revolutionary (1979b: manipulation).

Early in the 20th century, the analysis of discourse was vital for ethnography as a key to understanding a culture. Whereas, as we have seen, ‘theoretical linguistics’ insisted on a dichotomy, this field insisted on unity:

Utterance and situation are bound up inextricably with each other and the context of situation is indispensable for the understanding of the words. [...] For each verbal
statement by a human being has the aim and function of expressing some thought or feeling actual at that moment and in that situation, [...] either to serve purposes of common action, or to establish ties of purely social communion, or else to deliver the speaker of violent feelings or passions. (Malinowski 1923)

Here is a sample in the language of the Trobriand Islands (today officially known as the Kiriwina Islands), with a piece by-piece version and then a fluent English version:

[1] Tasakaulo kaymatana yacida tawoulo-ovanu tasivila tagine we-run front-wood ourselves we-paddle in-place we-turn we-see soda; isakaulo ka’u’uya oluvieki similaveta Pilolu companion-ours he-runs rear-wood behind their-sea-arm Pilolu

‘We are rowing ourselves the front canoe; paddling in place, we, stop, turn, and see our companion; he is rowing the rear canoe behind their inlet Pilolu.’

The speaker was boasting to an audience about having showing the superiority of his canoe and rowing skills.

In this comprehensive exploratory spirit, the goal of ethnography was stated to be ‘to grasp the native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realise his vision of his world’ (Malinowski 1961 [1922]: 25). However, like the ‘theoretical linguists’ as quoted above, the ethnographers were accorded special status:

Savages [...] have no knowledge of the total outline of any of their social structure. [...] The integration of all the details observed, the achievement of a sociological synthesis of all the various, relevant symptoms, is the task of the Ethnographer (Malinowski 1961 [1922]: 83-84, his italics)

To my mind, Malinowski did not so much ‘anticipate the distinction between description and analysis’ (Wikipedia) as sustain a distinction between ‘scientific’ and ‘savage’ understanding of culture, which ought to impede ‘realising the native’s vision of his world’.

The analysis of discourse was also vital since mid-century for American tagmemics (e.g. Pike 1967), which exploited linguistics to develop methods for fieldwork on unfamiliar languages. They worked for years outside academia proper in the ‘Summer Institute of Linguistics’, which, according to its website (www.sil.org), ‘has completed work in over 400 languages, and current active programs now number over 1,000’. This work seems to have

Such fieldwork has revealed strikingly disparate notions about what a language can offer for discourse to express. For example, Quechua of Peru, which normally places both Subject and Object before the Verb, has a range of Infixes and Suffixes to indicate grammatical and lexical categories, as demonstrated in this opening of a familiar folktale of the ‘Abductor Bear’ (in Spanish, *El Oso Raptor*) with its unsurprising quota of Spanish loan-words (Weber [ed.]) 1987; cf. Morote Best 1947-48). (3P: Third Person; CAUS: Causal; DIM: diminutive; FEM: Feminine; LOC: Locative; NOM: Nominative; OBJ: Objective; PLUR: Plural; SIMPAST: Simple Past)

Shuc punzha sumac huambra-ita chi urcu-man llucshi-rca one day pretty bachelor-DIM-FEM that mountain UP-TO go-out-3PSIMPAST
huagra-cuna-ta muyu-chi-nga-pac. Pai-pac huagra-huan shuc ali cow-PLUR-OBJ give-CAUS-NOM-OF he-OF cow-WITH one good
millma-yuc jatun oso-ta tupa-rca. |Pobrecita! fur-HAVE big bear-OBJ encounter-3PSIMPAST poor-little-woman

In times past in Peña Blanca [White Cliff], it is said there were very big bears. One day, a young and beautiful little maiden went out to the mountainside to care for her herd of cows. Nearby with her cows she encountered a big, very furry bear. Poor little woman!

Her fate was not so grim as this opening suggests. The bear carries her off to his house up in a big tree and tells her he will provide everything but she can never leave. Sure enough, he brings here plentiful, choice foods, and she is content enough despite the singular inconveniences attendant upon an arboreal residence, yet... Well, you can imagine a rescuing hero in the offing.

Quechua is not a threatened language; with some 10 million speakers throughout the east of South America, it is the most widely spoken of all Native American languages. But in most countries, its speakers are socially marginalised, which points up the value of recording and cultivating of its folklore by means of discourse analysis. All the greater is the value for endangered Native American languages to the North such as Seneca, for which a distinguished expert has been asked to prepare teaching materials from his turn his
fieldwork research (e.g. Chafe 1963, 1967; see now Chafe 1997 on ‘the importance of Native American languages’).

Discourse has been analysed from rather different perspectives in functional linguistics, which has grown in several branches. A Czechoslovakian branch, sometimes called the Prague School founded by Vilém Mathesius and his pupils, exploited their knowledge of the Slavic. All these languages can exploit word order in discourse to suggest degrees of communicative dynamism (Firbas 1971): relative interest and informativity of elements within an utterance or sentence. The logical strategy puts the Theme with lower dynamism early and then places the Rheme with the higher dynamism later on, just as you would set the stage before bringing on the main characters (survey of models in Beaugrande 1992). But this strategy is less conducive to English, French, and German than to Czech and Slovak, as illustrated by these parallel passages from the Gospel according to Luke (2:8-9) in the New Testament (compare Firbas 1995):

[3a] And there were in the same country shepherds abiding in the field, keeping watch over their flock by night. And, lo, the angel of the Lord came upon them, and the glory of the Lord shone round about them.

[3b] Or il y avait dans la même contrée des bergers, qui couchaient dans les champs et gardaient leurs troupeaux pendant les veilles de la nuit. Un ange du Seigneur se présenta à eux; la gloire du Seigneur resplendit autour d’eux.


[3d] V té krajině nocovali pod širým nebem pastýři a strádali se na hlídce u svého stáda. Najednou u nich stál anděl Páně a sláva Páně se kolem nich rozzářila.


In all five versions, the first Clause opens by specifying the Place (‘in the same country’), which had been recently mentioned (‘Joseph went up from Galilee into Judaea’, 2:4), and reserves the position of high dynamism for the shepherds, who are being mentioned for the first time in the Gospel according to Luke (and, in a literal rather than figural sense, for the first time in the New Testament). Their activity of keeping watch over their flock by night,
being highly predictable, can be relegated to a Participial Modifier (English) or a Relative Clause (French). The English and French [3a-b] place both the angel and the glory at the very start of their Clauses; the German does the same except for the brief obligatory displacement with initial ‘da’ followed by Verb, then Subject. The Clauses end with Pronouns of low dynamism (‘them, eux, ihnen – sie’). The Definite Article in the English text (‘the angel’) might suggest this is the same angel Gabriel who announced the miracle to Mary (Luke 1:26-38), but the French and German texts (as well as a modern English text I consulted) all have the Indefinite Article. Czech and Slovak use no Articles at all, but positioning the angel (‘anděl, anjel’) near the end of the Clauses could signal the same function of Indefiniteness as well as high dynamism. The Slovak version [3e] gets the angel the latest after the Lord (‘Pánoj anjel’ versus Czech ‘anděl Páně’), and is the only version to put the glory (‘sláva’) at the very end of the next Clause, thus being more attentive to dynamism than [3d]. The parallel effect would be marked in English, though not at all odd:

[3f] And, lo, there came upon them the angel of the Lord, and round about them shone the glory of the Lord.

To my own ear in fact, this yields a more impressive cadence.

The term British functionalism is mainly applied to ethnography, anthropology, and even psychology, but can apply to discourse analysis as well. One direction focused upon fieldwork on classroom discourse. Instead of ‘linguistic units’ and ‘rules’ of more ‘theoretical’ investigations, the main terms highlighted discourse moves like initiation and follow-up by the teacher (T), and bid and response by a learner (L), e.g. in [14] (cf. Sinclair and Brazil 1982: 45):

[4] Initiation T Give me a sentence using an animal’s name as food, please.
Response L1 We shall have a beef for supper tonight.
Follow-up T Good. That’s almost right, but ‘beef’ is uncountable so it’s ‘we shall have beef’, not ‘we shall have a beef’.
Initiation T Try again, someone else.
Response L2 We shall have a plate of sheep for supper tonight.
Follow-up T No, we don’t eat ‘sheep’, we eat ‘mutton’, or ‘lamb’.
Initiation T Say it correctly.
Response L2 We shall have a plate of mutton for supper tonight.
Follow-up T Good. We shall have mutton for supper. Don’t use ‘a plate’ when there’s more than one of you.
Such discourse plainly occurs only in classrooms, pursuing the timeworn crusade for ‘correct’ or ‘standard’ usage. The pupils are not to tell what they like to eat and why, or how to cook it. The task is far more artificial: saying ‘an animal’s name as food’, which easily traps pupils with the tricky English usage of French loan-words for the foods (e.g. ‘mutton’, ‘beef’, ‘veal’) instead of the animals’ usual names. Communication is subordinated to fine points of usage that the teacher summarily illustrates without giving useable explanations.

Several British functionalists who adopted the brand name of systemic functional linguistics, with some influence from the ethnography of Malinowski, also rejected the orthodox dichotomy and insisted that language but text and discourse as well are systemic, as are the relations between the two (Halliday 1992; see now Beaugrande 2006). They also surmounted the dichotomy between ‘lexicon’ and ‘grammar’ by unifying the lexicogrammar (cf. Halliday 1994).

One method to explore the transition of language-system to discourse-system is to analyse data where the lexicogrammar is put to unconventional use, such as William Golding’s *The Inheritors*. To evoke a ‘Neanderthal tribe’s point of view’, Golding uses clause patterns whose ‘subjects are not people’ but ‘parts of the body or inanimate objects’; the effect is ‘an atmosphere of ineffectual activity’ and ‘helplessness’, and a ‘reluctance to envisage the ‘whole man’ ‘participating in a process’ (Halliday 1973: 123, 125). When the Neanderthal Lok watches a person from a more advanced tribe shooting an arrow at him, the event is expressed as a series of natural processes performed by a ‘stick’ and a ‘twig’:

[5] The bushes twitched again [...] The man turned sideways in the bushes and looked at Lok along his shoulder. A stick rose upright and there was a lump of bone in the middle [...] The stick began to grow shorter at both ends. Then it shot out to full length again. The dead tree by Lok’s ear acquired a voice. ‘Clop!’ His ear twitched and he turned to the tree. By his face there had grown a twig. (Golding 1955: 106f)

These choices deliberately omit the connection between ‘stick’ and ‘twig’ in a single weapon of bow and arrow, plus the causes and effects involved, e.g., bending and releasing the bow, seen head-on as a stick ‘growing shorter at both ends’ and then ‘shooting out to full length’ and propelling the ‘lump of bone’ and its shaft to ‘the tree by his face’. Lok’s notion of a ‘dead tree’ suddenly ‘growing a twig’ symbolises the Neanderthals’ archaic and mystified worldview, dooming them to a destruction they can neither understand nor resist, at the hands of a more evolved people.
Functional approaches across the board have recently received a substantial boost from **corpus linguistics**, which works with enormous samplings of authentic discourse, moving emphasis from the word or sentence to the *pattern*, which often tends to suggest cognitive or social attitudes. For example, I find the passive colligation of pronoun + be + ‘to be’ + past participle uniformly associated with pejorative attitude. In data from the British National Corpus, the sinister inconveniences to which ‘I am’ (or ‘you are’, ‘he/she is’ etc.) ‘to be’ subjected include ‘hounded’, ‘demoted’, ‘despised’, ‘cut out’, ‘punished unfairly’, ‘investigated’, ‘arrested’, ‘prosecuted’, ‘convicted’, ‘incarcerated’, ‘imprisoned for life’, ‘chained hand and foot’, ‘hanged’. In data from my own English Prose Corpus of ‘classic’ discourses, I am to be ‘abandoned’, ‘humbled’, ‘persecuted’, ‘trampled upon’, ‘devoured’, ‘condemned’, and ‘hanged’ all over again — and, for bad measure, ‘boiled alive’, ‘burned at the stake’, and ‘buried at sea’. Ouch.

A radically different perspective emerged from the field of **artificial intelligence**, which analysed discourse to investigate how a computer programs might be said to ‘understand natural language’ as opposed to artificial programming languages. This work became entangled in the vast stores of world-knowledge even in simple tasks like processing a prosaic news item like [6] (data adapted from Cullingford 1978: 4ff).

[6] A New Jersey man was killed Friday evening when a car swerved off Route 69 and struck a tree. David Hall, 27, was pronounced dead at Milford Hospital. The driver, Frank Miller, was treated and released. No charges were filed, according to investigating officer Robert Onofrio.

The program can apply a knowledge-array called *schema* or *script* for ‘vehicle accidents’, specifying relevant data about what caused the accident, who was killed or injured, and whether charges were filed. This prior knowledge supports the swift comprehension of the news item along with appropriate inferences, e.g., that the ‘driver’ lost control rather than deliberately heading for the tree with the intent to knock it down and cart it off home for his wood-carving hobby.

Cognitive determinacies multiply if you reflect more deeply. North American readers should know that the ‘tree’ was a sturdy Northern outdoor tree rather than a dwarf bonsai in a manour-house conservatory, or a plastic Christmas tree in a trendy shopping mall; that the late Mr Hall was taken to ‘hospital’ by an ambulance and not by mountain bike, skateboard, or jet-ski; that Miller was ‘treated’ by dressing his injuries and not by honouring him with a full-dress dinner; that he was ‘released’ by being allowed to leave the police hospital rather than being unlocked from heavy Guantanamo-style manacles; and so on. Obviously,
probabilities must be built into the system (Halliday 1991); but these are cognitively determinate despite being computationally evasive.

Yet another approach in discourse has been more devoted to live talk in society, and supplied by the analysis of conversation in ethnomethodology, whose home discipline was sociology rather than linguistics. Harold Garfinkel (1974) reported coining the term ethnomethodology for the participants' commonsense 'methodology' for ordinary social interactions, patterned after such terms as 'ethnoscience' or 'ethnomedicine' for people's commonsense knowledge of what 'science' or 'medicine' do.

Conversation is usually managed by its participants quite tightly and fluently, with few conspicuous breaks or disturbances. The significance of utterances is clearly a function of the ongoing interaction as a whole rather than just the meanings of words or phrases, witness this bit of taped conversation collected by Emmanuel Schegloff (1987: 208f) (capitals show emphasis; colons indicate lengthened sounds, spacing approximate delays):

[7.1] B. WELL, honey? I'll prob'l'y SEE yuh one a' these days
[7.2] A. OH::: God YEAH
[7.3] B: Uhh huh!
[7.4] A: We—
[7.5] A: But I c— I jis' couldn' git down there
[7.6] B: Oh—Oh I know I'M not askin yuh tuh come down
[7.7] A: Jesus I mean I just didn't have five minutes yesterday

Two middle-aged sisters who apparently haven't visited each other for some time are conversing on the telephone. Sister B probably intends to signal a closing with the usual reference to a future seeing [6.1] (compare English 'see ya', French 'au revoir', German 'auf Wiedersehen', Spanish 'hasta la vista' etc.). But sister A understands a complaint about not having visited, and makes excuses for why she 'jis' couldn' git down there' [6.5]. Sister B displays that she appreciates A’s problems and signals that she was not pressing her claims to a visit, overlapping with A’s excuse of ‘not having five minutes yesterday’ [6.6-7].

Ethnomethodologists like Schegloff emphasise that the conversational analysis can document its own interpretations with those made by the actual participants, in this case, A’s misunderstanding and B’s venture to amend it. Though ‘often unnoticed or underappreciated in casual observation or even effortful recollection of how talk goes’, the ‘detailed practices and features of the conduct of talk — hesitations, anticipations, apparent disfluencies, or inconsequential choices’ — ‘are strikingly accessible to empirical inquiry’ (Schegloff 1992).
My own major concern has been the field of **text linguistics**, which will partially provide the framework later on in the section C on methodology. Its central conception is the **seven principles** of **textuality**: a human achievement in making connections wherever communicative events occur (cf. Beaugrande and Dressler 1981; Beaugrande 1997, 2004). The connections among linguistic forms like words or word-endings make up **Cohesion**, and those among the ‘meanings’ or ‘concepts’ make up **Coherence**; **Intentionality** covers what speakers intend, and **Acceptability** what hearers engage to do; **Informativity** concerns how new or unexpected the content is; **Situationality** concerns ongoing circumstances of the interaction; and **Intertextuality** covers relations with other texts, particularly ones from the same or a similar ‘text type’.

Here, I very briefly demonstrate these seven principles with a ‘Classified’ advert from *Psychology Today* (August 1983, p. 82) under the heading ‘Parapsychology’.


Here, Intertextuality is generally specified by the text type ‘classified advert’. Intention and Acceptance are typical: the writers publicise an offer for the readers to take up. The ‘text type’ shapes the modest Cohesion, showing just one command with the imperative (‘harness!’) suggesting that you will indeed manage it, and one ordinary sentence, plus the incomplete phrases typical of addresses. No command is given to ‘contact us’ or ‘dispatch us your raven with a parchment of inquiry’ — just the address.

Coherence centres on the topic of ‘witchcraft’, which (un)common sense holds to be the activities of ‘witches’ and to grant extraordinary ‘powers’. This central topic is combined somewhat picturesquely with the ‘student’ topic of enrolling in courses and (not mentioned) paying fees. The concept ‘foremost’ helps connect the two topics, since stories of ‘witches’ often tell of superlatives, and ‘students’ ought be attracted to the ‘foremost’ authorities in a field. In return, a submerged contradiction impends when the Frosts themselves claim to ‘harness’ such ‘foremost powers’ themselves yet are obliged to seek fee-paying ‘students’ instead of just, say, using their ‘powers’ to conjure up spirits who can unearth buried treasure and transform any foolhardy bill-collector into a changeable tree toad (*Hyla versicolor*).

The Informativity starts out high, not merely by claiming that witchcraft ‘has real ‘powers’ in today’s world but also by inviting ordinary readers to ‘harness’ them. Also quite high is the inflat,euntestable claim to being the ‘world’s foremost’, although such claims are so commonly made in U.S. advertising that American readers may not be surprised. Perhaps
the offer to ‘accept students’ has some surprise value too (shouldn’t witches have ‘apprentices’?), though less so in a classified column uniformly offering paid services.

The Situationality entails the supposition — correct, as shall see in a moment — that some readers will indeed aspire to become ‘students’. This prospect must be viewed in the broader social Situationality of resurgent superstition, especially in areas like the American Southeast (in this case North Carolina) as a desperate response to a ‘modernism’ too complicated for many people to comprehend or control (Beaugrande 1997). The sinking feeling of powerlessness creates a vacuum some people try to fill by ‘harnessing powers’ of any imaginable kind: ‘despairing of their own arms’ fortitude, to join with witches’ (*Henry VI*).

This Situational point can be supported with specific Intertextuality by noticing more recent texts about Gavin and Yvonne in the Internet, where just their names yielded 1340 hits on AltaVista in June 2006. Their website (www.wicca.org) advertises a ‘Church and School of Wicca’ providentially moved to West Virginia (insert your own joke here), and avows that ‘more than 200,000 seekers have contacted them from every corner of the globe’. Among the ‘courses’ of the ‘school I find ‘Astral Travel’, ‘Mystical Awareness’, and ‘Practical Sorcery’ (who needs Hogwarts and Harry Potter?). The Frosts ‘have a busy travel schedule, but an all expenses paid vacation to Florida (including speaking at your festival) is not out of the question’. Now: who will, ‘so grossly led, this juggling witchcraft with revenue cherish’? (*King John*).

The several fields enumerated so far seem to have coincided during the late 1970s and early 1980s in the field of discourse processing. Its avowed goal was to support research in ‘the many disciplines that deal with discourse — sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, linguistics proper, sociology of language, ethnoscience, educational psychology (e.g. classroom interaction), clinical psychology (e.g. the clinical interview), computational linguistics, and so forth’ (Freedle 1977: xvi).

To do so, a daunting issue had to be addressed: how do people actually process a discourse during real communication? Not surprisingly, vivid debates encircled the question of whether people store a more or less ‘surface copy’ of the discourse they hear or read (as linguists would credit), or else some ‘deeper representation’ (as psychologists would credit), and if the latter, what kind. Some findings indicate a mix of strategies and results. Here is a very brief sample from the opening of a text from a children’s reader (see Beaugrande 1980: VI.3 for full discussion):
[9] A great black and yellow V-2 rocket 46 feet long stood in a New Mexico desert. For fuel it carried eight tons of alcohol and liquid oxygen. [...] Amid a great roar and burst of the giant rocket rose slowly and then faster and faster.

College students who read the text and recalled it partially reproduced the text and partially reconstructed it, apparently working with some deeper categories. Thus, the colours were also reported as ‘red’, ‘green’, ‘blue’, ‘white’, and ‘silver’; the fuels as ‘hydrogen’, ‘gasoline’, and ‘nitrogen’; and the location as ‘Mexico’, ‘Arizona’, and ‘Morocco’. Besides, over a third of our readers reported ‘take-off’, which is not in the text.

Discourse processing turned up at least one major surprise: immediate memory access for discourse meanings is not parsimonious and perhaps not even selective (Kintsch 1988). Precise experiments indicated that when a word is recognised, all its meanings are initially ‘activated’, not just the relevant one for the context. Yet very soon the irrelevant ones are ‘deactivated’, while the relevant ones raise their activation and spread it out. Suppose you are a speaker of American English reading a text on a moving computer display containing this passage:

[10] The townspeople were amazed to find that all the buildings had collapsed except the mint.

The text suddenly halts at ‘mint’, and the display gives you a target item to decide if it’s a real word. For a brief interval of roughly half a second, your response would show activation for both the relevant ‘money’ and the irrelevant ‘candy’, but not for the inferable ‘earthquake’ (what made the ‘buildings collapse’). Thereafter, the irrelevant item would lose its activation while the relevant and the inferable items would gain. Evidently, the context ‘self-organises’ during this tiny interval.

The most immediate fons et origo of critical discourse analysis were, I believe, ‘critical linguistics’ (e.g. Mey 1979 [original 1974]; Fowler, Hodge, Kress, and Trew 1979). The ‘critical’ work was clearly distinguished by its resolve to accept ‘ideology’ (along with ‘power’, ‘domination’ etc.) as a legitimate object of investigation, calling to my mind the neglected proposals of the persecuted Vološinov (1973 [orig. 1929]: 9), who envisioned a ‘Marxist theory of ideologies’ as ‘the basis for studies of scientific knowledge’. Yet precisely because ‘linguistics’ was not conceptualised for any such task, the transition to ‘discourse analysis’ awaited the input of still more fields of recent provenance, such as social psychology (e.g. Billig 1986; Potter and Wetherell 1987), social cognition (e.g. Fiske and Taylor 1984), and rhetorical psychology (e.g. Billig 1991). A typical concern there might be concept of ‘violence’ among New Zealanders talking about rioting at a rugby match against the South
African Springboks in April 1981. For the police, interviewees explained the violence and "skull-cracking" as understandable "human" responses to "provocation" [11-12]. But for the protesters, the violence was either a pleasurable goal for "trouble-makers" who had no "moral" positions on the "issue" of apartheid [13] or else (shudder) "communists" [14] — the perennial pejorative buzzword brandished against anyone promoting human rights (cf. Potter and Wetherell 1987: 122ff).

[11] policemen are only ordinary people / they must have had a lot of provocation and I don't blame them if at the last they were a bit rough
[12] I think [sic] the police acted very well / they're only human if they lashed out and cracked a skull occasionally, it was / hah / only a very human action
[13] I feel very strongly that it gave trouble-makers who weren't interested in the basic moral of it an opportunity to get in and cause trouble to beat up people / to smash property
[14] what really angered me that a certain small group of New Zealanders [...] who are communists I believe / led a lot of well-meaning New Zealanders who abhor apartheid and organised them you know / to jump up and down and infringe the rights of other New Zealanders

These discursive constructs make it possible to ignore or excuse the "infringement of rights" both by "skull-cracking" police and by the South African government. The adaptive value of such accounts is obvious in a country that has long infringed the human rights of the Maoris, a darker-skinned minority who are not immigrants at all but the original inhabitants of New Zealand for at least 1,000 years. To crown the irony, "maori" in their own language means "normal" or "ordinary". We Pakeha are the ones who look and act weird — an impression fully confirmed by the frantic antics of the New Zealand All Blacks (their clothes, that is) performing the maori "haka" chant and dance before each rugby match, not to mention the zealous New Zealand fans doing it at home before the telly, at imminent risk to the furniture.

These, then, are some of fields I would regard as bearing upon the history of discourse analysis. Their diversity might well be a blessing in enhancing our prospects for dealing with so broad a domain. Perhaps critical discourse analysis would be less disputatious today if it were more mindful of its roots and evolution.

B. Ideology

In some quarters, the 'ideology of critical discourse analysis' may sound like an oxymoron. This effect could be due to the largely pejorative interpretation of the term within science and
within our own field (cf. Geertz 1973; Zima 1981; Pêcheux 1982). A typical instance was articulated by Talcott Parsons:

The essential criteria of an ideology [are its] deviations from scientific objectivity [...] The problem of ideology arises where there is a discrepancy between what is believed and what can be [established as] scientifically correct.

By today’s standards, such pronouncements sound dated even on their own terms. For my part, the analysis of discourse cannot be ‘objective’ insofar as the analyst is always already a participant irrevocably implicated in the production of the discourse being analysed. I can attempt to envision the intended, non-analytic participants, maybe even the dupe who flies off on his broom to master ‘Practical Sorcery’ (course fee: US$ 190) at the ‘School of Wicca’. But I am still quite different from them all, and this difference is the margin which can empower my analysis — not to be ‘correct’, but, as a goal, to be non-trivial, insightful, and socially relevant. I thus feel much in tune with Neisser’s (1976: 2) concept of ecological validity, i.e., how far ‘a theory has something to say about what people do in real, culturally significant situations’ and says it in ways that ‘make sense to the participants’.

Similarly, my own ideology differs from the ideology not merely of witchcraft devotees, but of hard-line scientists who claim to be free of all ideology. The term itself deserves a definition as neutral we find in our dictionaries, viz.: ‘a systematic body of concepts especially about human life or culture’ (Webster’s Seventh Collegiate, p. 413); ‘a body of doctrine or thought that guides an individual, social movement, institution, or group’ (Random House Webster’s, p. 668); or ‘a belief or set of beliefs, especially the political beliefs, on which people, parties, or countries base their actions’ (Collins COBUILD, p. 718).

Meanwhile, the pejorative interpretation resurfaces in critical discourse analysis when we read: ‘ideology is significations generated within power relations as a dimension of the exercise of power and struggle over power’ (Fairclough 1992: 67); or even: ‘ideology supports violence and is critically shaped by and in a context of violence’ and by ‘physical pain and social dehumanisation’ (Lemke 1995: 12f, his italics). Convincing data are increasingly open and ‘violent’ in public discourse, e.g., on immigration [10], racism [11], and academic freedom [12]

[10] Our [British] traditions of fairness and tolerance are being exploited by every terrorist, crook, screwball, and scrounger who wants a free ride at our expense (Daily Mail, 28 Nov. 1990)
[11] Nobody is less able to face the truth than the hysterical ‘anti-racist brigade’. Their intolerance is such that they try to silence or sack anyone who doesn’t toe their party line (Sun, 23 Oct. 1990)

[12] liberal academics [have] abandoned scholarly objectivity to create academic disciplines that were in actuality political movements; [...] ethnic studies, women’s studies etc. have one intent only, that is: undermining the American education system through the transformation of scholarship and teaching into blatant politics (Florida Review, 12 Oct. 1990)

Such discourse displays the strategy of making victims into victimisers (‘Opfer-Täter Umkehr’ in Ruth Wodak’s work) by absurdly accusing them of seizing the initiative in dark deeds for which they could have no reasonable motivation, e.g., ‘academics’ striving to ‘undermine the educational system’ that gives them a livelihood.

I would prefer to distinguish at least between left-wing ideology holding that human rights are inclusive and equal in theory, even though social conditions create exclusions and inequalities in practice, versus right-wing ideology holding that human rights must be exclusive and unequal in both theory and practice in exact proportion to each individual’s share of wealth and power, no matter how these were acquired. In such terms, critical discourse analysis is not the foe or scourge of all ideology — which would effectively foreclose our own ideological space — but rather the articulations of left-wing ideology seeking to deconstruct right-wing ideologies by analysing their discourse. In effect, our enterprise is interwoven with resistances and reversals: to inform the uninformed; to empower the disempowered; to demystify the mystified; to clarify obscurity; and to raise general consciousness for the potential of discourse for such an enterprise.

And a rather unique enterprise it is, given the already mentioned implication of the analyst in the very processes we attempt to deconstruct. There is no zero degree of uninvolvment for us to leap in prior to any understanding of the data, and no zero ideology as our starting point where we can build a domain for what is ‘established as scientifically correct’. Even the ‘hard sciences’ are discursive constructs, modes of communication about what is ‘currently’ said to be ‘probably’ correct. High tech like linear accelerators, femtosecond lasers, and space telescopes enable discoveries that would be useless if they were could not be transposed into discourse; for non-specialists, it is discourse that ‘establishes’ them but also ‘disestablishes’ some prior discourse as ‘non-correct’.

Some discourse analysts compare the computer and the large corpus to the tools of science like the microscope that energised great leaps forward. But our version of microscopes
partially reflect back our own eyes, and claims for discourse analysis to be a ‘science’ and hence free of ideology are a window dressing that belies our own practice. Critical discourse analysis has wisely learned its lesson, but its legion of critics have not and indeed cannot even understand our strenuous work to get understanding itself into our sights and sites. They remain trapped in the dualistic tautology between discourse and meaning and reproach us for ‘obfuscating’ matters that must be simple because they seem to ‘non-critical’ outlooks.

But to judge from the rather random, disgruntled, and blinkered abuse heaped upon CDA, such as I see posted on ‘Language and the New Capitalism’ even as I am writing this, CDA needs to be more assertive and definitive about its own ideology. I have thus proposed and substantially elaborated the ideology of ecologism, wherein the theory and practice of society, including science and especially CDA, strive for a dialectical reconciliation of theory and practise in a transdisciplinary pursuit of humane and democratic action, interaction, and discourse (Beaugrande 1997, 2004). I would cite such encouraging trends as expounded in the *Gaia Atlas of Planet Management* (Myers et al. 1993) and *The Quark and the Jaguar* (Gell-Mann 1994). We are not alone.

**C. Methodology**

The motley critics of CDA have a point when they assert that the field looks to them like a composite if not indeed a miscellany of methodologies. Given the history I have sketched in section A, this appearance is hardly surprising, but it is problematic for introducing or expounding the field to newcomers or outsiders.

My own methodology has all along been heavily data-driven, with a designed developed from continuing active analysis of authentic discourse. This approach stands in programmatic contrast to the heavily theory-driven methodologies we confront in books or essays where hardly any discourse is analysed in any depth. Nor indeed can I remotely imagine how any methodical analysis could be based on theorising in modes like this:

> [14] We can clearly see [sic!] that there is no bi-univocal correspondence between linear signifying links or archi-writing depending on the author, and this multireferential, multi-dimensional machinic catalysis. The symmetry of scale, the transversality, the pathetic non-discursive character of their expansion: all these dimensions remove us from the logic of the excluded middle and reinforce us in our dismissal of the ontological binarism (Felix Guattari, in *le Figaro*, translated in Sokal and Bricmont 1999).
Nor, to be honest, can I imagine what socially relevant purpose can be served by such mystifying, self-indulgent lucubrations. They merely supply fuel for strident criticism of CDA, even if, as I would maintain, they are not a legitimate part of CDA at all.

My advocacy is that methodology should grow and be shaped by the methods that serve analysis, while at the same time helping to determine what counts as ‘analysis’. In the broadest sense, the latter is a relation between discourse and meta-discourse; it becomes a critical relation when it consciously poses against discourse its own counter-discourse, uncovering, resisting, or reversing the routine sense-making procedures that were expected by the original producers of the discourse. This process is not ‘objective’, since none of its components or concerns is an ‘object’. And it does not demarcate boundaries among ‘analysis’, ‘description’, and ‘commentary’.

So the primordial demand upon methodology is to organise methods for specific modes of discursive work. Whatever is not serviceable — such as vociferations about ‘multi-dimensional machinic catalysis’, whatever that may mean — can be safely consigned to the dustbin of discursive history.

To my knowledge, the ‘seven standards of textuality’ (briefly illustrated above for commercial witchery) were greeted by a considerable echo because they readily transfer to methods for a range of discourses as diverse as tractor operation manuals and Gulf war news reports. In my latest design, these standards have been overlaid by three interactive factors: Lexicogrammar, Prosody, and Visuality (Beaugrande 2004). In the small space remaining here, my best shot is to show the design at work — without quibbling over whether it fits somebody’s definition of ‘analysis’. Some terms will display an intentional affinity to systemic function linguistics, mediated by reworking the terminology (also in Beaugrande 1997).

My sample discourse comes from the domain of international advertising and undertakes to sell nothing less than a whole country. It was published in Time magazine (Asian edition, 24 June 1994); my numbering is merely for handy reference:

[15.1] Shopping, once a chore for necessities and now an art form and major leisure activity, is a great barometer of social change.[15.2] If you shopped in Indonesia before the 1980s, your options were limited to traditional markets and neighbourhood ‘mom and pop’ stores. [15.3] Wealthy Indonesians were forced to go overseas if they wanted to buy upmarket international brands [15.4] because these goods were simply not for sale at home.

[15.5] Then came the retail revolution. [15.6] Now there are hundreds of supermarkets,
department stores, plazas, malls, and supermalls to rival the best in the west dotted all over the archipelago; [15.7] a mega mall and a hyper mall are on the drawing board. [15.8] Growing per capita income — now at US$ 750 per annum — [15.9] and Indonesia’s massive population has [sic] spurred a retail frenzy [15.10] which began in the capital Jakarta, the country’s headquarters for commerce, industry and its burgeoning middle class — [15.11] Indonesia’s prime shoppers. [...] [15.12] Our steadily expanding economy is coupled with rapidly rising family incomes; [15.13] the middle and upper-income groups who constitute our consumer base are the groups exhibiting the most dramatic upward mobility. [15.14] The nation’s growing middle class population, those with annual incomes over US$ 4,500, is already estimated to total nearly 20 million. [15.15] We saw shopping malls as another type of family recreation where you all go to relax and have fun.

The discourse astutely interfaces a multiple Intentionality: to whet the public (or just private) appetite for shopping; to boast about the spread of malls; to project a bullish air of economic progress in ‘rising family incomes’; to extol the management of the Indonesian economy; and to make the country attractive for investors, ‘upmarket’ tourists, and ‘wealthy Indonesians’ who (perish the thought) might otherwise shop, invest, or vacation ‘overseas’. These three groups are reassured that Indonesia will treat their money well, whether by returning high profits from investment or by furnishing ‘upmarket international brands’ to flaunt in the faces of the languishing populace.

The Intention of extolling the Indonesian economy adduces ‘social change’ as the force propelling the ‘rapidly rising family incomes’ [15.1, 12]. The ‘middle and upper-income groups’ are asserted to ‘constitute our consumer base’ [15.13]; but elsewhere, only the ‘middle class’ are designated ‘Indonesia’s prime shoppers’ [15.11]. To be sure, blurring the border between middle and upper incomes is an alluring notion for the vainglorious social climbing latent in the euphemism ‘upward mobility’. But the ‘burgeoning middle class’ is the key group leading the ‘retail frenzy’ in their drive to display their recent comparative wealth, whereas the upper class languidly takes its long-standing superlative wealth in stride.

In an intriguing move of self-deconstruction, the discourse also plants clues that this ‘social change’ has bypassed nearly all of the population, provided we dig deeper with the aid of some arithmetic. If the whole population was roughly 190 million, and the population with ‘incomes over US$ 4,500’ came to ‘20 million’ [15.14], then 89% (170 million) must have been in the lower class living on less than $4,500. If we multiply the whole population by a ‘per capita income’ of $750 [15.8] for each citizen, the total income of Indonesia was around

$142.5 billion. Multiplying $4500 by the 20 million citizens whose 'incomes' were at least that much [15.14] gives a total of $90 billion. If we adjust our first total by subtracting the second total, $52.5 billion was left over for the 170 million in the lower class, so their average income for a year would be just $308.82 apiece — 85¢ a day — even if the rest did not earn any more than US$4,500 — 15 times as much — but of course Suharto's ravenous flock of cronies and relatives did, as was amply disclosed after the ignominious downfall of his horrifically corrupt regime in 1999, five years after this advert came out.

So a latent contradiction might be demystified at the epicentre of the Intentionality of our discourse, yet all to animate Acceptability for investors. On the one hand, the statistics could serve the intention of touting the progress of the 'economy' as a whole by camouflaging the regressive poverty of 89% of the population behind an ‘income’ cooked to look at least twice as high ($750 versus $308) — a pungently ironic conception of ‘growth’ [15.8]! On the other hand, the same statistics could serve the intention of allowing interested readers to compute the poverty, as I did. The contradiction thus fades into an intentional dualism engrained in the current 'global free market': if you do business in Indonesia, the rich will buy your products at top prices, whilst the poor will work your operations at bottom wages. A win-win situation.

The poverty of the workers is irrelevant anyway insofar as they wouldn't be 'shopping' in your 'malls' even if the latter were not well shielded by the 'security' rent-a-cops near the entrance. Entirely in the spirit of the 'post-modern' economy, Indonesia has shifted its emphasis in marketing away from large volumes of low-priced commodities — the 'necessities' in 'mom and pop stores' — over to small volumes of high-priced commodities — the 'upmarket brands' in 'supermalls' — purchased just because they are not 'necessities' and thus best advertise the buyers' discretionary wealth and refined tastes. These brands make each act of acquisition into an iconic public bid for invidious prestige by certifying over and over the buyer's surplus affluence. So the notion that 'wealthy Indonesians' simply must be enabled to buy those 'brands' [15.3] is treated here as totally obvious.

To manage Cohesion and Coherence, thematic content is strategically placed near the front of Clauses or Sentences, or of some other unit situated by itself. Thus, the Subject of the first Sentence sets the theme to be 'shopping' [15.1], and other Subjects fall into a prominent Thematic Sequence: ‘wealthy Indonesians’ [15.3]; ‘these goods’ [15.4]; ‘growing income’ [15.8]; ‘expanding economy’ [15.12]; ‘middle and upper-income groups’ [15.13]; and ‘middle class population’ [15.14].
Other Thematic Sequences contribute as well, as when ‘shopping’ links up with ‘shopped – for sale – retail – commerce – retail – shoppers’. An intimately related Thematic Sequence is centred on money: ‘wealthy – upmarket – income – economy – incomes – middle and upper-income – incomes’. More elaborately connected is a Sequence for growth: ‘hundreds – growing – massive – burgeoning – expanding – rising – upward – growing’; expressions can form iconic Morphemic Sequences to mimic the ‘growing’ process in the size of places to shop, e.g. ‘markets => upmarket => supermarkets’; ‘stores => department stores’; ‘malls => supermalls => mega mall => hyper mall’. These Sequences could attract ‘dotted’ in [15.6], which usually means ‘scattered’ but here could mean ‘found everywhere’; and could be iconic for the ‘frenzy’ in [15.10]. I would even wonder whether ‘per capita’ and ‘capital’ [15.8, 10], though seemingly remote in meaning, might not trigger associations with the imported capitalism that has distributed the wealth in this cynically skewed head count.

The vitality of attitudes in the Lexicogrammar, a special insight of corpus linguistics, as we saw, is strategic here too. Some of the Items carry attitudes prefigured in ordinary usage, e.g., pejorative for a ‘chore’ [15.1] being tedious, and ‘forced’ implying compulsion [15.4]. Other Items take on attitudes in context, as when ‘tradition’, usually ameliorative in Southeast Asian cultures, appears pejorative here by association with backwardness and ‘limitations’ [15.1, 2, 4]. In return, ‘frenzy’ (typically collocated with people or sharks gone bonkers) appears unexpectedly ameliorative as a manifestation of ‘growing income’ [15.8-9], though in my reaction more of the sharkish meaning persists than was probably intended.

The sole Sequences of pejorative expressions decry the bleak situation ‘before the 1980s’: ‘chore – necessities – forced’; ‘limited – not for sale’; ‘traditional markets – neighbourhood mom and pop stores’. As I noted, the common ameliorative value of ‘tradition’ is reset to pejorative here to animate people into buying the very latest modern commodities, for which they should run like the clappers to ‘mega-malls’. The use of ‘mom and pop’ as a patronising Western term is pungently ironic in a culture where the traditional home life accords profound respect to parents and grandparents. Still, the breakdown of family ties furthers the interests of a market where selfish people spend all the more on surplus commodities to pamper themselves. The modern ‘family’ now forms a collective of hedonists who flock to ‘shopping malls’ for ‘recreation’, ‘relaxation’, and ‘fun’ [15.15, 1] — to revel ostentatiously in the ‘leisure’ based upon wealth not earned by (heaven forbid!) labour.

The Lexicogrammar is easily dominated by the Thematic Sequences enumerated above, featuring expressions and collocations relating to marketing, wealth, and growth. Set off against this background are a few choices that take on markedness and weight. The
The collocation ‘shopping as an art form’ is formatted like an appositive or a simile to be accepted as a sealed package, rather than a direct statement formatted as a clause, such as ‘shopping is an art form’, though the latter is, I’m sad to report, 10 times more frequent on the Internet, notably for locales like Singapore and Hong Kong, where shopping seems to the raison d’etre if not the raison d’etat (but I didn’t find Indonesia). Perhaps a sly inference is intended, associating with the pricey ‘art objects’ and ‘collector’s items’ malls love to hawk. Shoppers might feel more mocked to be swarmed as artists if they were less hungry for status and for the certification of ‘refined taste’ supposedly certified by ‘upmarket’ purchases.

The collocation ‘rival the best in the west’ [15.6], in contrast, seems pointedly plain, like an improvised cliché (11,153 hits were returned on the Internet with AltaVista). But it may be a subtly marked choice in contexts where shopping malls and ‘international brands’ are the essential symbols, indexes, and icons of the Westernisation so cordially wedded to consumerism. The colourless collocation unobtrusively puts local shopping facilities on a par not just with the ‘west’ but with the latter’s ‘best’.

The mixed lexicogrammatical styles of the discourse could address multiple audiences: expressly informal style (e.g., ‘chore – mom and pop – at home – relax and have fun’) alongside the more formal styles of the discourses of business (e.g., ‘goods – sale – retail – drawing board – commerce – consumer base’), economics (e.g., ‘economy – per capita – upper-income groups – estimated’), and sociology (e.g., ‘barometer of social change – revolution – middle class – family incomes – upward mobility’). If the informal style suggests easy-going friendliness, the formal styles flatter readers by attributing to them academic and intellectual prowess, plus high fluency in English — itself no minor status symbol in Southeast Asia. The same attribution may be implied by the Greek-based Morphemes ‘mega’ and ‘hyper’, which convey a pleasing if vague promise of superlative bigness rounding off the enumeration of seven types of shopping places, as I have pointed out.

The lexical and stylistic shift in the last sentence [15.15] turns so plain as to acquire paradoxical weight, where we might have expected something more like [15.15a].

[15.15] We saw shopping malls as another type of family recreation where you all go to relax and have fun.

[15.15a] Our economic indicators projected shopping malls to proffer attractive familial recreation and relaxation sites.

Instead, the formal styles of business, economics, and so on, abruptly yield to an informal style of carefree life, as if the builders of malls just now remembered all they really want is to supply ‘fun’ and ‘relaxation’ for your whole ‘family,’ purely out of community spirit — never mind the submerged irony of converting the traditional family as a close-knit community of love and respect into a dispersed collective of selfish, fun-seeking mall-freaks. The choice ‘you all go’ is exquisitely cheeky for a guarded exclusive showcase where 89% of all Indonesians would probably be turned away by ‘security officers’.

In the Lexicogrammar, strategic choices can be noted for Transitivity in the sense of Halliday (1994). The Active Verbs strategically collocate with their Direct Objects: ‘buy – brands’; ‘rival – best’; ‘spurred – frenzy’; ‘saw – malls’. Three Passives deal with restrictions on shopping: ‘were limited – were not for sale – were forced’, the last of these connoting an unjust compulsion upon the ‘wealthy’ (VIII.58); two more are for the abstractions typical of academic discourse: ‘is coupled – is estimated’. The dominant Transitivity is rather the Medial, though only a few Finite Verbs occur: ‘is a barometer – go overseas – are on the drawing board – go to relax’. The one Existential Medial in ‘there are…supermalls’ [15.6] avoids saying who built or owned them, as if they spontaneously sprang like the Indonesian flower Rafflesia, the world’s largest (and smelliest) flower, from the foment of ‘the retail revolution’; the latter’s Definite Article implies that this ‘revolution’ is a recognised reality. Most of the Medial activities are expressed instead either as Nouns, e.g., ‘frenzy – mobility’; or as Present Participles, e.g., ‘growing – burgeoning – expanding – rising – exhibiting – happening’, invoking an effect of intense development and change like natural processes. I find not a single genuine Agent plus Action Verb as Subject plus Predicate, such as ‘plutocratic foreigners built posh shopping malls’. In fact, the Subjects of the Clauses are never an individual Agent, but only collectives like ‘population’ or abstractions like ‘economy’.

This distribution suggests we might examine the Agent Pronouns. The Second Person ‘you’ appears at the start as the unlucky pre-1980s shopper whose ‘options were limited’; and at the happy end as the lucky 1994 shopper homing in on ‘relaxation’ and ‘fun’. The First Person Plural appears in ‘our expanding economy’ and ‘our consumer base’ [15.12, 13].
Since these entities elsewhere appear with the Possessive Nouns ‘nation’s’ and ‘Indonesia’s’ [15.14, 11], the discourse can subtly purport to speak for the whole country. But the ‘we’ who ‘saw family fun’ in [15.15] would presumably be the creators of ‘shopping malls’, who would love to identify their own interests with those of the nation, and maybe they managed to conscience them that they did.

The Prosody of the discourse — shown here by ▼ for Strong Stress and ▲ for Weak Stress (Beaugrande 2004) — serves to intensify sequenced Items like ‘▼forced – ▼hun-dreds – ▼mas-sive – ▼head-▲quar-ters – dra-▲mat-ic – ▼best in the ▼west’; or contrasts like ‘▼once – ▼now ‘; ‘▼chore – ▼art ▲form ‘; or ‘▼meg-a ▲mall – ▼hy-per-▲mall’. Strong Stress for strategic end weight would probably fall upon ‘▼social ▼change’, ‘▲in-ter-▲na-tion-al ▼brands’, ‘▼re-tail ▼fren-zy’, ‘▼prime ▲shop-pers’, and ‘▲up-ward mo-▲bil-ity’. Opportunities for end weight can be multiplied by having short Tone Groups that are not Clauses, e.g., the Appositives ‘▼ma-jor ▼leis-ure ac-▼tiv-i-ty’ in [15.1] and ‘▼prime ▲shop-pers’ in [15.11]. Also, ‘▼re-tail ▲rev-o-▲lu-tion’ is a Subject which gets end weight by being displaced after its Verb; compare the weaker effect of ‘Then the ▼re-tail ▲rev-o-▲lu-tion ▲came’.

The Visuality of the sample is dominated by retouched photos of the inside and outside of a Himalayan ‘supermall’. The interior shows the standard Visuality of a shopping mall, which makes it the perfected symbol, index and icon, all at once, of the in-your-face ‘look what I got!’ life-style that drives the manic pursuit of colossal wealth by fair means or (more often) foul, and wins support for political leaders, however repugnant, who coddle the rich and shaft the poor — Suharto and Marcos, Thatcher and Reagan, Poppy Bush and Son-of-a-Bush. The soaring atrium with its honeycomb of escalators, the orgies of plate glass, marble, and fake gold-and-silver, the tropical hothouse greenery, the fashion-model sales clerks, and the trendily overdressed clientele, compose the ideal visual frame for the ‘international brands’ as the correspondingly overpriced commodities imported from prestigious far-away places and pressed upon you by glossy adverts telling you what self-respecting muckety-mucks must have even if they don’t know it.
At the centre of the interior photo stands a lone woman in an evening dress looking outward, presumably waiting for an affluent male shopper — maybe you, sir.

Although more detailed than many studies of a brief discourse, my treatment certainly does not purport to be complete; such is not a realistic aspiration of discourse analysis at large. Still, I hope to have shown that the design is not nearly so simple as it would seem in an ordinary reading. And I hope to have pursued the analysis (if such it be) at least to the point of uncovering some non-trivial and socially relevant strategies and motivations which can plausibly be attributed to selected choices and patterns, and which are not readily apparent on the surface.

Nor again does my own analysis purport to be ‘correct’ or ‘objective’. I am obviously not the intended reader who jets off to Indonesia in quest of ‘income’ or ‘fun’; and shopping malls freak me out like a horror trip. On the contrary, I have worked out a programmatic counter-discourse to deconstruct the Intentionality of the actual writer(s) and the Acceptability of the desired reader(s), taking sides with ecologism in order to frame the Situationality of consumerism. If 11% of the population has (at the very least) 15 times more money than the other 89% in abject poverty, and if that money is being showily squandered in ‘supermalls’, then I for one decline to praise the country for ‘social change’; and I regard any such ‘consumer frenzy’ as a social disease and long-range bioplanetary menace, not at all as just ‘another type of family recreation’. 
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### About the author

Throughout his career, Robert de Beaugrande has worked for a multi-disciplinary ‘science of text and discourse’, of which ‘Language and Capitalism’ -- an unthinkable journal back when he began -- today easily constitutes an welcome and indeed overdue domain for the application of a spiritedly ‘critical analysis’. As he has explicitly argued in his recent books, ‘capitalism’ (money matters), as well as ‘socialism’ (society matters) are discursive constructs whose uncritical mass reception once split the globe and now promises to shatter it altogether.